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While there is a clear policy shift towards large-scale industrialization in the state of
West Bengal (WB) during the early 1990s, not much improvement can be discerned in
the performance of the manufacturing output. Moreover, contrary to the Indian
experience, more than half of the manufacturing output is still produced by small
initiatives in the unorganized sector. We argue that it is the peculiarity of  institutional
behaviour that determines the policy outcomes in the state. The rigidities in the political
as well as the economic institutions in the state are prompting us to look at WB as a
classic case of "institutional stickiness" leading to "path dependency". Clearly the right
institutions for creating a more enabling environment for industry do not seem to exist.
Not only do they not exist, but also their growth or emergence is frustrated by an
overarching institution -'the party' which seems to keep encroaching upon every sphere.
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is based on information collected from some selected stakeholders: business associations,
firms, trade unions  and bureaucrats.
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Introduction
That the rates of growth across Indian states started diverging more in the 1990s over
the 1980s is  accepted even by the sympathizers of the reform. The highest rates of
industrial growth were observed in the states of Andhra Pradesh and Gujrat which grew
at more than 10 percent per annum. In contrast, Indian states of Assam, Orissa, Madhya
Pradesh and WB grew at 3 percent or less per annum. However, despite  increasing
convergence of the industrial policies of all the Indian states since the early 1990s
(Kohli,2004), their performances have been rather divergent. This paper tries to address
this question in the context of WB, unique among Indian  states not only by virtue of
being ruled by an uninterrupted  Leftist regime for the last thirty-two years1, but also by
having witnessed a turnaround of sorts in its outlook towards private capital within this
period. In understanding state-business relations in WB, we are therefore focusing
primarily on the last thirty years. We concentrate on the manufacturing sector alone
which was the primary focus of the  liberalization reform in India since the 1980s (Sen,
2009).
The divergences in policy performance suggest differential levels of policy
implementation. However, the success of policy implementation does not depend only
on the political will of the state. The structure of the economy determined by the
existing institutions often turns out to be crucial in deciding levels of implementation
of a new policy (Munro, 1995, Rodrich et al, 2003). These institutions are, in turn,
determined by the specific historical processes of a particular economy.
1 1977 till date6
In this paper while we incorporate some ideas from the transaction-cost paradigm to
explain the behaviour of different agents of production, we trace the evolution of state-
business relations mainly in the light of historical institutionalism. This approach, as
Leftwich (2009) indicates, treats human beings as non-neutral agents who will not
respond automatically or immediately to changes in the incentive structures: people are
everywhere embedded deeply in long-standing cultural, social and political institutional
patterns. It may be relevant to mention what Herbert Simon (1951) reminds us:  workers
are not passive agents of production as assumed by neo-classical economic analysis.
We therefore look at the institutional aspects, both formal and informal. Our findings
suggest that it is the peculiarity of institutional behaviour that determines the policy
outcomes in WB. The rigidities in political as well as economic institutions in the state
are prompting us to look at WB as a classic case of “institutional stickiness” leading to
“path dependency” and resulting in the decline of organized2  manufacturing alongside
a corresponding proliferation of small-scale activities in the unorganized sector of the
state.
We follow a descriptive analytic style to present our findings supplemented by quantitative
information as and when required. The strength of the paper lies in the pragmatic way
it relates some empirical findings to the relevant theoretical ideas. The paper is organized
in five sections. Section 2 deals with the issues of policy and performance. This section
helps us in identifying the research questions which we deal with on the basis of primary
data. Sections three and four present the findings of the paper and section five concludes.
The paper is based on both secondary and primary data. The secondary data sources
used are the following: Annual Survey of Industries, Population Census, National
Accounts Statistics and National Sample Survey. These secondary sources apart, we
have collected primary information from different stake holders of the process such as
the business associations, bureaucrats, trade unions of different affiliations and business
firms. We have followed a purposive sampling procedure for selecting the respondents
in different categories. While in the case of other respondents we had to largely depend
2 The ‘organized’ sector broadly comprises of the public sector and the incorporated private
sector of the economy. All remaining economic activities fall in the unorganized territory. While
in a typically developing economy, the unorganized sector provides employment to the majority
and contributes significantly to the output, no governmental regulations are applicable to this
sector. Hence, ‘unorganized’ sector, as against ‘organized’, generally refers to the unregulated
economic activities (Harris-White et al, 2007). As is usual in the literature, we have also used
the words ‘organized’ and ‘formal’ interchangeably and in contrast to the ‘unorganized’ or
‘informal’ sector.7
on their availability, for the firm survey we could follow a relatively more structured
sample frame (see A1 for elucidation on sampling methodology). The primary survey
has been conducted mainly in two phases: during December –January, 2008 and during
March-April-May, 2009.
2. Policy and  Performance: manufacturing sector of WB in the context of a more
liberal economic regime
At the time of Independence, WB, industrially advanced at that time, inherited mainly
export-oriented old processing industries most of which had been controlled by the
British before the Second World War. In the 1930s most of these industries had gone
through a recession, and net investment by the firms controlling them had slowed
down or disappeared altogether.  After the war, along with Independence came the
dislocations of Partition that severely affected the trade links between East and West
Bengal. As a result, the most important industries in this region, jute and tea, were
badly hit. Another important difficulty that cropped up for Bengal industry during this
period was associated with the transfer of ownership from British hands to not-so-
competent native entrepreneurs. This was not the case in the other important industrial
belt of Bombay during this time (Bagchi,1972) .
In Bombay, textile industry was mainly inward-looking and managed mostly under
indigenous entrepreneurship, which was conspicuous by its absence in Bengal. In Bengal
the regional social and political elite, far removed from productive activities in both
agricultural and urban sectors, were transplanted into the urban radicalized milieu of
Bengal after acquiring western education, access to governmental professions and middle-
class status (Sinha, 2005).  This elite remained at the forefront of a modern cultural
renaissance and nationalist fervor in Bengal and the seeds of leftism found in them their
most fertile soil. Such ideas contributed towards shaping particular political institutions
like trade unions in a certain way that turned out to be significant for the development
of industry in the state.
After Independence,  problems of Bengal large-scale industry were aggravated by two
sets of central government policies:  freight equalization for coal and steel, and the
overwhelming emphasis on import substitution which completely overlooked the
problems faced by the jute industry, a highly labour-intensive one in Bengal (Bagchi,
1998). Apart from these direct consequences of the policy changes on the manufacturing
sector of Bengal which resulted in industrial decline in the state, there were a few strategic
lapses also on part of the state leadership.
An antipathy between Bengal and Delhi is noticeable from the beginning.  Kohli (2009)
observes that the traditional ambivalence of the Bengali bhadrolok towards Gandhi8
manifested itself as a belief that Congress and Delhi did not have Bengal’s interest at
heart, a belief that was reinforced by a sense of regional nationalism. This ethos of
distrust and suspicion towards the centre led to a confrontationist strategy on part of
the state and prevented it from lobbying pragmatically to obtain licenses and industrial
investment. Although spurred by a different ideology and routed differently, this
confrontationist strategy continued with the Left Front Government (LFG) contributing
to   the drastic decline in the number of new licenses for big business (Sinha, 2005).
Along with these, a radical trade unionism backed by leftist intellectual support,
mentioned earlier, brought in a militant frictional atmosphere in the industrial arena of
Bengal which scared away new private investment to a significant extent. Moreover, by
the mid-1960s consequent to central government disinvestment3  in the infrastructure
sector, WB engineering industry, which had developed an increasing dependence on
the railways was also badly hit. This created  large-scale unemployment in the organized
manufacturing in the state (Raychoudhuri et al, 2007). In this context, WB
manufacturing firms  tended to get locked in a low productivity- low wage segment of
the spectrum of products dominated by the small firms largely in the unorganized
sector. Large-scale entrepreneurs started farming out production to the small scale units
in general and unorganized sector in particular. Thus they could avoid the militant
trade unionism while simultaneously grabbing  the incentives enjoyed by the small
firms(Banerjee et al., 1999; Bagchi, 1982; 1998).  Consequently unorganized
manufacturing in the state emerged as an important sector.
2.1 The question of policy during the LF regime
Against this backdrop of industrial decline, the LFG  comes to power in 1977. To begin
with the LFG took up the important agrarian reforms programme already initiated by
the Congress. Subsequently, backed by Panchayat Raj Act of 1973, it introduced
significant decentralization measures in  rural areas . These programmes did improve
rural income and helped generate effective demand  for  non-agricultural goods produced
mainly in the village manufacturing units in the unorganized sector (Human development
Report,2004) reinforcing the increasing importance of unorganized manufacturing in
the state.  While all this was happening, large-scale organized manufacturing was nearly
reaching stagnation.
To boost industrialization, the LFG claimed to have given top priority to electricity
generation and infrastructure development. State initiatives regarding power generation
3 This had happened as a consequence of Indo-Pakistan war and droughts in the mid sixties
(Alhuwalia, 1985).9
and petrochemicals did not meet with the cooperation desired from the center. In fact,
the LFG alleges that it took the central government seven years to sanction the thermal
power station at Bakreswar. Given the requirement of Central endorsement in setting
up large and medium-scale industries, the government had no option but to look up to
the Centre ( TOSB,2006). But it is interesting to note that states with ruling political
parties other than Congress could lobby successfully to get things done more easily
than WB (Sinha, 2005). Moreover, ideologically it was difficult for the CPIM- led LFG
to show a great commitment towards big industry, especially private capital. As a result
of prolonged neglect of basic infrastructure, large units gradually decelerated and the
skilled workers employed therein opened shops in the neighborhood, carrying on
businesses either subcontracted - from medium and some large industries – or
independently (Duttachoudhuri, 1995). According to veteran trade unionists of both
Howrah and Durgapur region a large number of these small units were operating from
the unorganized sector. This resulted in poor quality, bad after sales service and untimely
delivery, thwarting the competitiveness of local industry and its  growth. Between 1984
and 2001, industrial capital investment in WB increased only fourfold, while it grew
more than seven times for the rest of India (TOSB, 2006).
During the end of the 1980s, as a result of the decline in traditional industries such as
jute, cotton and engineering in the state  workers in large numbers were losing jobs.
Alternative job prospects were bleak as no new industrial initiatives were coming up in
the organized sector for reasons mentioned above. It has been argued that consequently,
the working class became vulnerable in the hands of the industrialists; trade unions
agreed to terms of settlements in the 80s which in the past would have been unthinkable
(Dasgupta, 1998). The significant decline in the number of strikes since the left
government assumed office and the spectacular rise in the number of lockouts, when all
the states show a decline in both, do give support to the vulnerability hypothesis. There
was another serious implication of this decline in industry in the state. The LFG was
getting increasingly alienated from the urban population. The continuous defeat in the
urban areas especially in Kolkata made it clear that the government is getting alienated
from the urban middle class particularly the unemployed educated youth aspiring for
industrial jobs (Chakraborty, 2008).
In this context the already liberalizing Indian economy took a more specific turn  towards
an altered  macro-economic regime involving dismantling of the license Raj and opening
up of the Indian economy to the world market in a significant way.  Initially, these more
market-oriented changes were viewed skeptically by the LFG as being largely dictated
by the IMF and the World Bank (TOSB, 2006). But soon the liberal line of the ruling
party and the state could see the positive implications of the abolition of licenses on the10
one hand and removal of the Freight Equalization policy on the other for industrial
development  in the state. This line of positive thinking was reinforced by the LFG’s
realization of its increasing alienation from the urban voters.
During this time the Chambers of Commerce thus succeeded in drawing the LFG’s
attention to the changed scenario and in   convincing its top-line that there was actually
no alternative to industrialization. Earlier it was commonplace for Union Ministers of
Commerce to take business delegations to foreign countries for wooing investment.
State governments in different parts of India were now seen to take such initiatives, and
even compete for attracting both foreign and Indian investors. It needs to be mentioned
here that the then CM, Jyoti Basu, in fact, in several public speeches talked about the
necessity of industrialization in the state since the inception of the LFG.
The government’s seriousness in promoting industrialization was noticeable towards
the last phase of LF rule under Jyoti Basu. This change of stance manifested in an
Industrial Policy, the first by any Government of WB, on 23rd.September, 1994, which
proclaimed : ‘ The Government of WB has formulated a liberal and investor-friendly
industrial policy to change the industrial scenario in the state. The WB Government’s
own proposals for an alternative economic policy call for a statement of policy by the
Government of WB on the vital issues of industrial development, rehabilitation of sick
units and generation of employment opportunities and protection of the legitimate
interests of labour.’ 1994-95 therefore emerges as a critical juncture in the evolution of
State-Business relations in WB.
The salient features of the Industrial Policy of 1994-95   suggest the   altered role
envisaged by the state government : (a)  Welcoming foreign technology and investment,
as may be appropriate or mutually advantageous. (b) While not undermining the roles
of the Government and the Public Sector in ensuring social justice and balanced growth,
it highlights the key role of the private sector in providing accelerated growth. In the
context of the changes in the policies of the Government of India, the need for meeting
the increased demand for power and the constraints on the budgetary resources, the
State Government would also welcome private sector investment in power generation.
(c) Along with the Public and Private sectors, the State Government looks upon the
joint and assisted sectors as effective instruments for mobilizing necessary resources and
expertise in important areas of economic activity. (d) Improvement and up-gradation
of industrial infrastructure is indispensable for accelerated growth of industries. (e)
Other areas are improvement in roads, communications and development of Growth
Centres. These programmes would require massive investments in projects for the
development of industrial infrastructure through the Government or through the private
and joint sectors, wherever feasible.11
In keeping with this pro-industrialization drive , the LFG appointed Somnath Chatterjee,
the main leader in Parliament, as Chairman of the WB Industrial Development
Corporation (WBIDC) to look after business interests in the state. Indeed, officials and
politicians focused on changing the reputation of the LF by signaling its seriousness in
pursuing reforms. Having long dismissed the mainstream press as ‘bourgeois’, Chatterjee
began courting the media, giving numerous interviews in which he argued explicitly
that the credibility problem required WB to undertake larger and stronger reforms (
Sinha, 2005:83). However, an overnight change in the mind-set could not be taken for
granted. An ex- Executive Director of the WBIDC recalls :  when we went and informed
the Chairman about the profit of WBIDC, his immediate reaction was – ‘does this befit
a governmental organization ?’
To prop up the  industrialization-drive , the LFG organized   a Conference in 1999 on
‘ Destination WB’ where the McKenzie Advisory Council made a presentation on the
competitive advantages and potentials for industrialization in WB. Certain sectors were
particularly highlighted: infrastructure, petrochemicals, ancillary industries, agro-based
industries. Further, to attract and facilitate   investment, simplification of procedures,
reduction of regulations and red-tape were also contemplated: the single-window-system
was envisaged as a necessary first step.
As the reins of the LFG passed on to Buddhadev Bhattacharjee in 2001 through a
smooth transition, the cause of industrial revitalization in WB seemed buttressed. The
new CM took business delegations to Thailand, South-East Asia, Italy and also interacted
with entrepreneurs within India , exploring possibilities for industrial investment in the
state. WB by virtue of its strategic location was suitably poised to complement the
Central government’s ‘Look East’ policy for boosting trade with East Asian countries
and effectively function as India’s gateway to the Asia-Pacific region. The construction
of various industrial parks were  envisaged and some are already under way: ‘rubber
park’ at Domjur, a park for ‘tannery and leather industries’ at Bantala, an ‘apparel park’
for textiles and hosiery at Howrah and others..
While in case of other states the  change is almost  a continuation of earlier policies with
added emphasis ,the case of WB represents a complete turn-around. In order to
understand the implications of this, we divide the period spanning last three decades
into pre and post new industrial policy regimes in the state : late 1970s to 1994-95 and
1995-96 till date respectively. It is   important to note here that while the LFG was
devising this pro-industrial policy, a few dissenting voices within the ruling coalition
were audible, which dissensions were absent during the implementation of the other
major policies under the LFG earlier.12
2.2. The question of performance
A vulnerable workforce, as was claimed in the case of WB, generally creates favourable
conditions in the economy for renewed investment prospects. Moreover, with the changes
in the policy regime at the centre since early 1990s followed by changes proposed in the
new industrial policy of the state, it was expected that there would be a boost in the
investment scenario of the state. But a few changes apart, the trend of predominance of
the unorganized sector continues over the years. According to Figure I, since the mid
1990s unorganized manufacturing, in fact, has been contributing almost as much as
the organized sector and lately even more. Moreover, the rate of growth of organized
manufacturing is consistently lower than that of unorganized manufacturing both in
the post as well as in the pre new-industrial-policy regimes of the state. However, the
magnitude of the growth rate in the organized manufacturing has increased in the
second period (A2). The relative decline of the organized sector in the case of WB
becomes striking when we see how the state’s position deteriorates with respect to the
country as a whole during the last three decades when only the organized factory sector
is considered (A3).  In the year 2004-05 WB stands at the 7th position in terms of
manufacturing output considering all states in India. This position remains the same if
we look at the organized manufacturing as well. However, the position of the state
improves significantly to the 3rd   if we consider the unorganized manufacturing alone.
Figure 1: Percentage share (at 1993-94 prices) of the registered and unregistered4
manufacturing in total manufacturing output of WB during 1980-81 to 2004-05
4 NAS represents this data in terms of ‘registered and unregistered’ sectors, more or less with
the same meaning as ‘organized and unorganized’ sectors.
Source: National Account Statistics, WB13
In the employment front   the importance of the unorganized sector also accentuates
over the last three decades. In 2001 only around 13 percent of the workforce was
engaged in organized manufacturing (A 4). The significant decline in the absolute number
of employment over the last few decades, particularly in the post new-industrial-policy
era in the factory sector of manufacturing (A5) can surely be taken as one of the sources
from where employees enter the unorganized domain as casuals5.
The domination, and increasingly, by unorganized manufacturing in employment is
not unique to WB. What is unique is the domination of unorganized over the organized
sector in relation to output. This is surprising, given the notable changes in the attitudes
of the state towards large industry since the early 1990s as manifested in policies for
curtailing regulations  and developing infrastructure. Data on Industrial Entrepreneur’s
Memoranda (IEM) suggest that the number of industrialists showing interest in the
state is significantly low not only compared to some of the industrially advanced states
but also a few  relatively new ones. Disturbingly, the proposed investments are also
notably smaller in dimension. Is this attributable to poor policy implementation? Or is
it a deeper problem like lack of political will? However, it needs to be noted here that a
number of institutional changes were initiated in order to facilitate new investment,
such as the single window facility called Shilpa Bandhu , described earlier. Some new
large investments also did flow in from the Mitsubishi, Jai Balaji and Jindal Groups.
This probably explains the increase, though marginal, in the rate of growth of organized
manufacturing in the state in the post 1994-95 period.
A related study by Roychoudhuri et al in 2007, argues that the main reason for WB’s
failure to attract large investment is poor infrastructure  and  related inability of the
state to improve it over time. The physical infrastructure development index calculated
by Ghosh et al in 2004 indicates a sharp decline in the comparative ranking of WB in
India – from 9th. in 1981-82 to 17th. in  1991-92 .This index considered  transport
facility, gross irrigated area, per capita consumption of electricity and telephone main
line. In this respect the northern states of Punjab, Haryana and all the southern states
except Kerla show a much better prospect compared to WB. This information matches
well with the entrepreneur’s persistent willingness to prefer some states over others as
5 ‘Casuals’ or ‘Contract labourers’ are not employed on a permanent basis and therefore do not
come under labour laws of the formal sector. These labourers are sometimes employed through
a contractor for a specific job for a stipulated time period. Alternatively, they can be employed
directly, may not be even for a stipulated period , paid on a daily basis and doing all sorts of
unskilled manual jobs. The wage rate for these contract workers is significantly lower than that
of unskilled permanent workers14
revealed by IEM data. This is aggravated by the inadequacy of social infrastructure such
as poor quality of labour arising out of lack of education, particularly technical education.
This dismal plight of WB’s social infrastructure is widely known today.
Do labour productivity figures suggest further clues?
Figure 2: The levels of Labour productivity in the four states: 1980/81 to 2002/03
The level of labour productivity remained the lowest in the organized manufacturing
sector of WB compared to the industrially-more-advanced states of Maharashtra, Gujarat
and Tamil Nadu over the last three decades (Fig 2). The   labour-productivity levels
were quite close for all the four states till the mid-1980s. In fact, the real divergence
came only in the early 1990s placing Maharashtra and Gujarat much ahead of WB and
also TN. This is most probably because of the better utilization of liberalization policies
by the states of Maharashtra and Gujarat. However we find that workers in WB’s
organized manufacturing are getting relatively better wage rates compared to others
(Figure 3) except in Maharashtra.15
Figure 3: The levels of emolument rates in the four states: 1980/81 to 2002/03
Indeed, it is interesting that when the growth rate of productivity declines in the post-
1994-95 era, the wage rate actually increases. Moreover, the rate of decline in the wage
share to net value added shows an insignificant trend in the period after the new industrial
policy regime. This is happening when there was a perceptibly sharp decline in the rate
of growth of employment in the factory sector of manufacturing of negative order with
the second period showing as low as (-) 7.19 percent per annum (A 6). We wonder to
what extent the organized workforce in the state has been rendered vulnerable as claimed
by others. We try to address these apparently contradictory trends along with the
increasing emergence of the unorganized sector with the help of primary data in following
sections.
Labour productivity, among other things, depends directly on the production technology.
While it is difficult to characterize the technological status of production processes, one
possible way is to look at the real fixed asset formation per worker. In the formal or
organized sector real fixed assets per worker in the late 80s in WB was lower than both
Maharashtra and Gujarat but higher than Tamilnadu. While the picture remained
unchanged in the mid 1990s, by the early 2000 Tamilnadu also surpassed WB. In fact,
there is a deceleration of real fixed assets per worker in WB in the year 2000-01 over
1994-95 (Marjit et al, 2009). This indicates that in terms of technological modernization
WB manufacturing was not competing well with the industrially more developed states.16
It is worth mentioning here that none of the states shows decline in the per capita fixed
assets.
The labour productivity in the unorganized manufacturing in the state is not only
lower than the Indian average but also lower than industrially-more-developed states as
revealed from the NSS rounds on the unorganized sector.  Incidentally, there is an
increase in the real fixed assets per worker in unorganized manufacturing of the state,
though WB remains consistently at the bottom and significantly lower than the national
average in this regard in recent years.  The increase in capital intensity in production is
difficult to explain considering the continuous large-scale influx of people into the
unorganized sector in recent years. This may well be a result of under-reporting of
human beings working on the same machine6.  Further, the latest round of NSS on
employment unemployment (2004-05) shows the lowest wage rates prevailing in WB
in both rural and urban casual  labour markets. Is it then the cheapest labour that is
dragging the output to the unorganized sector in this state? This also opens up the
possibility of using contract/casual labour within the organized sector and farming out
production to the unorganized ones. This, in turn, is likely to lead to expansion of
outputs in unorganized manufacturing.
3. Business in relation to the State: Then and now
We now attempt to evaluate the question of policy implementation in view of the not-
so- significant improvement in large-scale manufacturing on the one  hand and
flourishing unorganized sector activities on the other.  We begin with the perceptions of
the bureaucrats and the business associations and then move on to the business firms.
Apex business organizations like  Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industries (BCCI),
Indian Chamber of Commerce (ICC), and Confederation of Indian Industries (CII)
confirm the altered pro-business stance of the LFG in the post 1994-95 period . However,
they  highlight serious lack in policy- implementation on part of the government
particularly in infrastructure, land procurement and labour which might have deterred
big businesses from getting attracted to the state. Interestingly, our suspicion about the
docility of the organized workforce arising out of the vulnerable conditions seems
reinforced. Some occasional references apart , we deal with the labour issues in the next
section. The business associations feel that physical infrastructure, especially Electricity
and Ports, must improve significantly to ensure long-term sustainable industrial growth
6 In the unorganized manufacturing it is often found that a large number of people working on
the same machine at different times especially if the machine is placed at home or the workshop
is adjacent to the household.17
in WB. The greatest constraint still is infrastructure alongside a poor work culture.
Despite the general perception that WB is a power-surplus state, the quality of power
needs to improve, alongside significant augmentation in power-supply capacity and
massive improvements in transmission and distribution systems. In respect to  ports,
proper infrastructure needs to be developed in Kolkata  and Haldia dock complexes.
Inland container yards need development and strengthening at Shiliguri and Jalpaiguri.
Business organizations also focus the need for a greener and cleaner state capital  -
Kolkata.
Unlike the apex business organizations, small scale enterprises’ associations remain
disillusioned with the present disposition of the government. The Secretary of the
Federation of Small And Medium scale   Industries ( FOSMI ) observes that not much
has happened to them despite the talked-about pro-business orientation in governmental
policy. The greatest hurdle continues to be the incredible volume of paperwork and
bureaucratic formalities required to start a small-scale unit. The Durgapur small
entrepreneur’s association mentioned that this is primarily why small firms invariably
hesitate to register themselves under the Factories’ Act (1948) and try to operate from
the unorganized sector.
Interactions with business organizations revealed a more fundamental problem of
analytical significance. Previously, businesses had to negotiate with the government and
vice versa. Presently, the businesses have to negotiate with the government, the party
and with the Opposition. The omnipresent phenomenon of the institution of ‘party’
seems to have encroached upon administrative spheres increasingly.  However, it may
be misleading to equate ‘party’ with the CPI(M).  Of course, by virtue of an efficient
structure of discipline and command, and a more systematic procedure of training of
cadres, the CPI(M) has been able to penetrate and control every institution in every
locality that it dominates. But where it  is unable to do so, other parties behave much
the same way (See  Chatterjee, 2009 in the context of rural Bengal). Business associations
feel that for healthy state-business relations , the Government must detach itself from
the Party for all issues, except for broad policy decisions, and there should be a consensus
between the government and the party on all major political and economic decisions as
it happened in the case of Gujarat ( Sinha,2005). In the case of WB, the party seems to
have stretched everywhere, so much so that the administration has often been   paralyzed
or incapacitated for action. Several accounts by  bureaucrats indicate this increasing
tension between formal governance  and informal party control as eroding the credibility
of the government. This overarching presence of the party means a corresponding
shrinking, if not disappearance, of other institutions because people seem to believe
that formal mechanisms like police or law courts , do not really matter for the latter are18
expensive, time-consuming and corrupt. This has been possible through the ‘political
management of illegalities’ ( Chatterjee, 2009).
Such political interference continues to retard infrastructural development in WB . A
senior bureaucrat informs that serious mismatch between demand and supply in respect
of electricity is attributable to the low PLF ( Plant Load Factor) of most plants which
have not been sufficiently upgraded. Efforts at such upgradation are thwarted by
infighting within and among political parties patronizing various vested interests and
seeking to ensure contracts for their own clients. Incidentally, the decision of the
government to construct four towers for electricity generation at Rajarhat could not be
implemented for the last two years on account of rivalries and clashes between political
parties.   Following is an illustrative case of how the alleged ‘management of illegalities’
can frustrate the adequacy of infrastructure- in this case, development of ports.
In February, 2002 a shipping company operating in eastern India  contracted  with
Calcutta Port Trust for operating a tug at Haldia Port. The technical aspects of the  tug’s
operation  like scale of manning were decided by the Director General of Shipping,
Government of India. But when operations were to commence, Ram Seth (name
changed),a local goon and prominent henchman of the CPI(M), had his men stop all
operations. He demanded  that his men, irrespective of their skills,  would have to be
employed on the vessel. The Police was not willing to take complaints about Ram Seth
or his gang, unless the Port officials approached them; the Port officials were unwilling
to go to the Police because Ram Seth was a veritable muscleman with political clout; the
company ultimately reached Writers’ Building whereafter the Chief Secretary of the
Government of WB asked the District Magistrate to arrange a meeting of all involved
and reconcile the problem. At the meeting Ram Seth demanded the Port officials to
give it in writing that never again will the Port appoint a private company for such
operations, which the Operations Manager of the Port declined, and ultimately the
District Magistrate sent his report to the government explaining his inability to solve a
‘political problem’ administratively. Recently ( 2009) again  Haldia Port was paralyzed
for ten days because labour from Ram Seth’s pool squatted across all entry points blocking
access to the port. This has crucial repercussions given that an industry’s selection of a
site around Haldia invariably considers the proximity and use of the Haldia Port, for
supply of raw materials or distribution of  products.
Further, a member firm of   FOSMI   had purchased a plot of land  for setting up a
plant, but soon after the boundary wall was erected , musclemen from the local CPI(M)
district committee objected that its permission was not taken  and all work was stopped.
Ultimately this industrialist was able to sell off the land to a prospective buyer , who has19
been able to set up his project ( probably by lavishing benefits on the local Party
bodies).This brings us to the vexatious issue of land acquisition in WB.   The opinion is
widely expressed by business associations that land acquisition for industrialization is a
major problem for the state , because land records are antiquated or unavailable. There
is no ‘land bank’. It is ironical that a government ruling for over thirty years, has not
done any resource analysis in this respect. In the aftermath of the Tata pullout of the
Nano project from Singur, considered to be amongst the most fertile areas in the state,
senior bureaucrats and business organizations feel that the state government must chalk
out suitable rehabilitation packages for those losing land due to acquisition, before
going ahead full steam and handing over land to the industry houses . Many opined
that ‘there ought to have been more consultation all through the process’.
Consultation was necessary not only between the government and the stakeholders but
also within the ruling party and the ruling coalition. The differences regarding land
acquisition between the chief minister and some colleagues of his own cabinet are well
known: Rezzak Mollah , Minister for Land and Land Reforms, observes : ‘The land
issue is a diabetes debilitating the LFG today. The entire process of land acquisition of
our government is flawed’.  Kshiti Goswami of RSP( Revolutionary Socialist Party), a
constituent of the LFG, comments “We also are victims of the partycracy of the CPI-
M, numerous decisions have been taken while keeping us in the dark…” He adds: “ If
the CPI(M) is serious about industrialization, why is there no initiative to revive the
numerous factories on  the two banks of the Ganges that remain  shut?”  Such intra-
party and inter-party differences are eroding the strength of the government. This is in
contrast to China where not only is there no opposition, but also where there is unified
party control over policy making. In WB such   increasing dissensions at various levels
is affecting governance and eroding public perception about the government’s seriousness
and ability to execute its own decisions. Such dissensions were absent during the
implementation of land reforms and decentralization, which had enhanced its credibility
as a pro-people government.
The problems emanating from non-existence of a land-bank are aggravated by
inconsistency, if not absence of any clear policy on land use on part of the government.
An ex- Executive Director of WBIDC  recalls: ‘ …In 2005 when the LFG was already
firm on its pro-business stance, and there was huge demand for industrial land, two
projects involving about 300 acres were sent back, because the then practice was that
for all projects involving more than 99 acres, cabinet approval would be necessary.
Fourteen months later, in May,2006, the cabinet passed Again a resolution approving
in principle  acquisition of land up to 35,000 acres’. All this seems to reinforce that the
government is unthinking, unsure, vacillating and unable to speak in one voice.20
Explaining turmoils  over  land acquisition, another  bureaucrat  offers a comprehensive
view: When the need for industrialization was seriously felt  the LFG  sought to initiate
policy changes (discussed earlier). However given the  lack of working class discipline
and infrastructure, mere policy changes wouldn’t suffice.  The government therefore
tried to play a behind-the-curtain game: take land from  cultivators by flexing political
muscles and  woo industrialists to invest  by offering them land at throw-away prices.
As Chandra (2008) observes : “…the cash-strapped LFG through its parastatals has
been profiteering from land transactions. The maverick CPI(M) WB Transportation
Minister, Subhas Chakroborty has publicly flayed his own government for running a
land speculation business, acquiring land at throwaway prices from farmers and selling
it at a premium.”(p. 44).  This strategy of the CPI(M) backfired in two ways: First, the
whole issue of ‘land grabbing’ received wide criticisms, with CPI(M) leaders including
the CM repeatedly trying ( in vain ?) to reassure the people that nobody would lose
land for development. Second, a fear psychosis developed among the farmers that their
land is no longer secure, which fear perhaps reinforces the growing popular distrust
against the Left Front government.
Additionally, some bureaucrats comment that bureaucracy is not a monolithic institution
that acts in unison, rightly or wrongly. There are multiple levels in the bureaucracy, and
in the absence of coordination of efforts and purpose, every move of the government is
likely to be frustrated. ‘The Big Picture is clearly missing with all the ministries’. This
problem of lack of coordination among multiple levels of bureaucracy has been
highlighted by  business organizations also who feel that industrial growth in WB is
thwarted by antiquated processes and time-consuming bureaucratic hurdles often backed
by the local party. We discuss this further in the context of the firms’ perceptions.
5.2. How do the firms look at the changes?
None of the large firms surveyed is found to take a definite position on the question of
infrastructural development of the state. However, it was also found that none of these
firms depend much on the state for the provision of electricity. Incidentally, according
to retired management personnel it is often because of the excessive cost of power that
lead to farming out production to the labour-intensive unorganized outlets both in
Durgapur and Howrah.  It is illuminating that all the large firms surveyed either had, or
expressed keenness to set up more advanced production units outside the state. But the
primary reason cited for establishing new units outside the state was troubled industrial
relations.  Moreover, they also shared the apprehension expressed by other respondents
on the issue of land acquisition. But, they did appreciate the improvements in the road
conditions in recent years.21
While medium and  small firms share the opinion about the improvement of roads,
they are clearly critical about power and water facilities. The ones based outside the
metropolis even mentioned no improvement at all in the sphere of availability of power
and water. Consequently, many of these firms desire to set up units outside the state.
On the whole, it appears that while, of late,  roads have improved in the state , the claim
of improvement in  power situation by the government (Economic Review, 2007-08),
is confined to the metropolis and only to large firms (if at all) outside the metropolis. In
the case of land, the small and medium units allege that the state invariably favours the
large houses. It looks like a case of ‘elite capture’ of scarce public resources (see Bardhan
et al,2006).
Since the establishment of the single-window-procedure for industry, it has been claimed
by the government that the necessary hazards pertaining to obtaining clearance for a
proposed initiative have been reduced significantly. However, the World Bank, 2008
study in this regard reports that as late as  2006, procedures in Kolkata take the longest
of 83 days to complete.
Figure 4: Time of starting business in different categories of firms
Field data collected during December-January, 2008-09
All types of firms in our sample took less time to start business compared to that reported
by the World Bank study for all Kolkata-based firms (Figure 4). But all  firms in our
sample are well–performing ones. It has been argued that well performing businesses
are always in a stronger position to establish informal connection with the state elites22
and extract favours (Qureshi et al, 2008). All the firms especially the large and the
medium ones maintain that the time required to start a new initiative was much longer
during the early 1990s. Figure 4 also suggests that large firms in the sample generally
can start business quicker than the medium and small units irrespective of the market
orientation. Small firms face numerous hazards even today to set up a business as also
mentioned by their associations reported earlier. However, linkage with the export market
seems to come handy for overriding regulational hazards in general. But none of the
small units in our sample, is a direct exporter. They are  linked either to the large/
influential manufacturers or to export houses based in big cities in India. Therefore it
may not be true that market orientation on its own can make the real difference in
manipulating state support.
Table 1: State regulations and the firm
Farm size Separate Percentage of senior Frequency of inspection by
employee management’s time spent the state govt. officials on an
for dealing  for dealing with the average per size group per
with the government on an average year
government per size group per year
2003-04 2008-09 2003-04 2008-09
Large Firm I, Not Not
Firm J, applicable applicable 1.2 0.75
Firm K,
Firm H
Medium Firm A Between Between
25 to 40 20 to 30 1.5 1.0
Small None of the Between Between Two to Two to three




Source: Same as above.
Large firms often lobby with the government directly without  moving the business
associations. Incidentally, none of the large units express any dissatisfaction about the
government’s efforts to eradicate rigidities in the system. Table 1 reveals that senior
management in small firms even in 2008-09 have to spend around 30 to 45 percent23
time in a year in dealing with the state and interestingly, this has not changed over a
period of five years. Apart from the regulatory hazards, small firms need to deal with
the state institutions for infrastructural facilities such as land, electricity, water and
institutional credit. However, this is not the case with the highly export-oriented ones.
In the case of export –oriented small firms often the large units involved in subcontracting,
arrange for the credit for production or give the necessary raw material. That the small
firms need to spend much time on dealing with the regulatory bodies is also corroborated
by the fact that the small firms report the highest number of annual inspection visits
over a period of five years (Table 1). Table 1 also suggests that each of the large firms has
a separate managerial staff to deal with the state. Medium firms too  have to spend
significant management time but there is a clear decrease  recently. Regarding the
frequency of inspection visits by the labour department and pollution control bodies,
there is a visible decline in both the large and medium group firms. Incidentally, during
this time one finds substantial increase in the use of contract labour employed at a rate
lower than the stipulated minimum wages of the relevant sectors (Table 2)7. This carries
a hint of collusive behavior between the state and the big business. This is supported by
the  independent trade unionists who pointed out the uncalled-for relaxations by the
state government in respect of pollution control measures in the case of large businesses.
This is corroborated by the increasing number of sponge-iron-producing units in the
state by influential business groups like  Jai Balaji. Sponge-iron is  known for its damaging
effects on environment and  people (Nagaric Manch, 2009). Can we call it good SBR?
It seems that in order to compensate for some serious lacunae related to infrastructure
and labour issues, the state is trying to go overboard even to the extent of illegalities.
The presence of a fulltime managerial staff to deal with the government in the large
firms even in recent years, and  substantial management time still required to deal with
the state in the cases of medium and small firms, don’t necessarily suggest hassle-free
dealings. Moreover, inspection visits have also not decreased   in the small firms. On
probing we found that  intrusion of the institution of a multi-layered party is playing its
own tricks. The individual firms mentioned that they needed to deal with different
levels of state administration separately. With the same political party in power for a
very long time  it is no longer a ‘homogenous state’ nor a homogeneous party. The state
has emerged as a multi-level, non-monolithic one, disaggregated across several local
power centres, nourished over all these years. In fact, firm A opined that, “ People at the
top may have the right inclination. But nothing will happen unless one can crack the
7
 
It is interesting to note here that there is a huge disparity in percentage of contract labour  used
as reported in the ASI and the primary information collected from sample firms. The same
finding is reported in Maity et al., 2009, on the basis of a much larger sample.24
Table 2: Percentage of Contract/casual labour in the sample firms
With some export share Totally domestic
in their sales market oriented
Firms Percentage of Firms Percentage of
contract labour contract labour
2005-06 2007-08 2005-2006 2007-2008
Large  Firms Firm J:  15
percent
export share NA 51 Firm H NA 40
Firm K: 25
percent
export share 47 59 Firm  I NA 42
Medium Firms Firm A: 40
percent
export share 91 92 Firm L NA 42
Firm E: 15
percent
export share 85 87 Firm M NA 46
Small Firms Firm B: 60
percent
export share NA 90 Firm F 93 95
Firm C: 65
percent
export share 98 100 Firm G NA 90
Firm D: 65
percent
export share 100 100
Source: Field survey, conducted during December, 2008 and January, 2009.
Note: “NA” refers to not available. Only blue collar workers have been
network  of cadres and local leaders who have over the years taken up prominent positions
within local communities and who have both financial and political clout”. Policy change
in favour of big business at the top for broader political achievements, do not seem  to
be readily accepted by local powers for it probably disturbs the existing rent- seeking25
behaviour giving rise to uncertainty about their immediate gains. This is an indication
of institutional stickiness ensuing from a clash of long-term and immediate interests of
different levels of political elites.
As Leftwitch  (2009; 8) observes:
 “…once an institutional choice/decision has been made or formed and sustained/
consolidated over time, it sets the pattern and gets ‘locked in’ and associated with
increasing returns (certainly for those who benefit from the institutional arrangements
and have the power to maintain them).”
Bureaucratic hassles usually lead to emergence of speed money in the economic system.
Sinha (2005) argues that as against Gujarat  the existence of speed money  is hardly
found in the case of WB. As a result it takes the longest time for a business to get started
in the state of WB. In course of our primary survey we tried to probe this question.
While offering gifts or paying  some money to the local government officials and the
local party leaders by firms is not really a stray incident in WB, it is difficult to reach
any conclusion about the effectiveness of the practice from the  information revealed by
the sample firms. However, one can imagine that firms will not keep paying officials
without reason. Small bribes work especially well when the outlook between the local
level and the top differs. When the larger hazards of getting permissions have become
easy to handle and the hurdle basically lies in operationalizing it, it is natural for the
businesses to get things moving by shedding a little money here and there. This finding
perhaps reinforces the thesis of sustained management of illegalities highlighted by
Chatterjee (2009).
Clearly the right institutions for creating a more enabling environment for organized
industry do not seem to exist in the state. Not only do they not exist, but also their
growth or emergence is frustrated by an overarching institution –the multi-layered
party- which seems to widen its domain increasingly. While large firms do seem to
confirm certain changes in operation which may give the impression of WB being an
investor-friendly destination, these changes are neither sufficient ( because vital problems
like inadequacy of infrastructure and power remain) nor pervasive ( relatively small and
medium scale firms feel discriminated against and unable to cope with bureaucratic
hurdles). Infrastructural lacunae and unchanging regulational hazards, aggravated by
political interference, seem to impel firms to operate from the unorganized sector or
farm out production to the unorganized sector so as to curtail costs, rather than expand
the scale of production.26
4. Institutional Stickiness: The case of trade union behaviour
We now turn to the labour issues pending to be addressed. How far can the ‘vulnerable
workforce’ be a factor in determining the non-performance of  large-scale industry
giving way to the unorganized sector? Recent  research (Pages et al, 2006) highlights
that the use of contract labour is increasing in  organized manufacturing  the country
over. WB is no exception. In the context of uncertain market conditions, management
find  it increasingly easier to adjust their production plans by retaining a small core of
permanent workers alongside a large number of contract workers under highly flexible
conditions of work and lower wage-cost (Majumdar et al, 2008).  Table 2 indicates not
only a very high share of contract employment in the sample firms but also an increase
in the share within a short span of two years. The increase is the sharpest in firm K,
categorized ‘large’.
When asked, the management maintained that in the years 2007-08 and 2008-09 a
large number of permanent employees retired through the voluntary retirement scheme
and the firm never filled those vacancies as they could conveniently transfer production
responsibilities to easily available contract/casual workers at much lower wages. These
findings corroborate the macro trends reported before. Some of the workers of the
older firms surveyed maintained that the practice of not filling up of the permanent
workers’ positions in the organized manufacturing units started since the early 1980s .
Few new permanent jobs have been created in the worker’s category in recent years.
Moreover, frequent declaration of lockouts in different sectors, mainly jute, led to the
absolute decline in the organized workforce in the state.
Our field data also suggest that majority of the large and medium firms farm out their
production considerably. Firm A stands at the top in this regard. Kolkata-based and
highly profit-making , this firm is a boutique cum manufacturer-exporter of traditional
Bengal weaves. Around 60 percent of its products is acquired from numerous weavers
spread across villages of Bengal (Table 3). In fact, two of our small-scale textile units, B
and C, based in Shantipur/ Phulia region are direct suppliers of  Firm A. Farming out
production is easier than in other sectors as  numerous skilled weavers in this craft are
available in clusters of interior Bengal. When asked how trade unions react to this work
organization especially as Firm A is Kolkata-based, management responded that it was
successful in keeping trade unions at bay since its inception in 1997 , particularly through
a  strategy of keeping the number of permanent workers as low as possible.  The altered
stance of the ruling party in not being as supportive of its trade union organ since the
mid 1990s helped in this regard.27
Table 3: Percentage share of production farmed out by the sample firms
With some export share in their sales Totally domestic market oriented
Firms Percentage of Firms Percentage of
production production farmed out
farmed out
Large Firm J:  15 Around 25 Firm H Information not
Firms percent export share available
Firm K: 25 percent Around 20 Firm  I Information not
export share available
Medium Firm A: 40 percent Around 60 Firm L Between 10 to 15
Firms export share
Firm E: 15 percent Information Firm M Does not reveal
export share not available information
Small Firm B: 60 percent Around 10 Firm F Does not farm out
Firms export share
Firm C: 65 percent Does not Firm G Does not farm out
export share farm out
Firm D: 65 percent
export share Does not farm
out
Source: Same as Table 2.
While ancillerization as against vertical integration has a long tradition in Bengal industry,
particularly in engineering and transport ,organized large-scale purchase of traditional
Bengal weaves  especially for exports is a feature which came along with the liberalization
policies of the 1990s. Moreover, improvement in road conditions in the post-1994-95
period helped reach distant villages and tap unexplored  possibilities . In fact, textiles
hold  the highest percentage share in the  value added  of WB’s manufacturing in  both
organized and unorganized sectors, and that too is increasing (data refer to  ASI and the
NSS Reports on Unorganized Manufacturing). It is pertinent to mention that the
elasticity of unorganized sector output is as high as 1.2 with respect to the organized
sector during 1980-81 to 2004-05. However, the elasticity is higher in the first half till
1994-95 compared to the second. The reason may lie in the fact that quite a few large
trading firms now acquire products directly from the unorganized producers for export
purposes. It is worth noting here that a number of retired management personnel from28
different firms inform that the amount of production farmed out is much more than
what firms have reported (Table 3).
How do the trade unions look at these facts? This question assumes particular relevance
as it was found that even the contract workers were members of the same unions. How
is it possible that the larger firms could increasingly  farm out a substantial amount of
production when their production capacity was not 100 percent utilized? Does this
mean that the workers’ unions have become so weak as to  accept the situation passively?
And this seems facilitated by the changed attitude of the state in favour of business at
present. But, then, why is it not possible to get the work done by the permanent workers
by utilizing existing capacity of the firm? Is it then the lack of infrastructure again that
decides the outcome or is it something more?
All the large firms indicated that while all other aspects of regulation improved in the
state,  the question of labour rigidity remains the same when it comes to the shop floor.
This is interesting as Ramaswamy (1999) notes : “ Ascendancy to political power appears
to remove the last vestiges of radicalism from Marxist unions. CITU has undergone a
veritable metamorphosis in Bengal since 1977 when their party came to power. The
new policy of moderation and responsibility received formal blessing from party and
union ideologues in a union conference in 1980. The ‘gherao’ which terrorised managers
in the sixties and seventies is no longer in evidence. The number of strikes have declined
sharply.” (p.5). Primary survey revealed that in some of the older firms  the peak of
militancy was encountered when CITU decided to capture a plant. Their typical style
was to insist upon a set of impossible demands and whip up violence in order to scare
the management, the other trade unions and the people in the locality. In this process
they often had their way. However, the methods of CITU were quite different where
they operated alone untroubled by other unions.  There they appeared to be more
amenable to reason.
According to the management the militancy in the bargaining process reduced
significantly as the patronage from the state leadership in favour of  pressure tactics is
now unavailable. However, the unions still bargain quite adamantly for higher wages
but are not insistent on filling up vacancies or making the contract workers permanent.
Obviously the trade unions prioritize insiders’ interests (permanent workers’) over the
outsiders’ (non-permanent workers). Firm level workers and the unit level leaders
understand that if the management can reduce the production cost by way of hiring
contract workers or farming out production partly to the unorganized sector, it is easier
to bargain for better wages. This finding is corroborative of our macro observations and
does question the hypothesis of ‘vulnerability of organized workers’ directly. Further, in29
order to be confirmed, a worker needs to work on contract or casual basis in a firm.
Trade unions play a very important role in this process of confirmation. According to
management the union leaders understand that it is, thus, easier to control the workers
as long as they are on the contract/casual basis. Incidentally, Sarkar (2006) argues that
people in WB depend on the political parties in a fundamental way for their livelihoods.
It is their vulnerability which compels them to do so. Further, an independent trade
union leader mentioned that in some cases the permanent workers (and the unit level
leaders) themselves practice subcontracting with the existing contract labourers and do
some other business during the office hours, safeguarded by the representative union.
As the contract/ casual labourers are also union members, the question of union
membership and membership levy does not pose a real problem for the union as
contractualization perpetuates8.
The management maintain that the union leaders always resist any work load increase
even for a short while under emergency especially in the private firms. Though the
contracts between the permanent workers and the management is always a written one
it is difficult to make it complete in every sense considering all contingencies explicitly
(Hart et al,1987 ). The permanent workers often take  advantage of this incompleteness
. Consequently management of all large firms mention that they are weary of taking the
permanent workers in confidence to promote technical modernization of a large-scale.
Technological modernization can lead to human asset specific conditions and in turn to
costly haggling (see Chakravarty,2002) especially in the context of an institutional failure
where workers’ union fail to work as a governance structure facilitating transaction
between the workers and the management (see Williamson, 1985).
Till the abolition of the licensing policies, the state and the ruling party were indifferent
to the ground reality of industrial relations and improving work ethic at the shop floor.
But in the changed scenario the senior CITU leaders are seeking to improve the work
ethic among permanent workers of the manufacturing units. But the management feel
that permanent workers have got habituated not to work and work only on overtime
payment. In Bengal,‘overtime’ virtually meant extra payment without extra hours of
work. Now while senior leaders at the state level ask cadres and unit-level leaders to
cooperate with the management at the shop floor, the workers passively resist. The
management inform tremendous increase of absenteeism among permanent workers in
8 There is usually no difference in the membership levy for the permanent and non permanent
workers and moreover, the levy is just a paltry sum of  Rs 1 or so for the larger central trade
unions like CITU (Mr. Veeraiah, CITU  general secretary, Andhrha Pradesh in an interview
with the authors on 10-06-09 in Hyderabad.30
recent years. Can the permanent workers, accustomed to wages without work, start
working sincerely at the instance of the party whip? The CITU state leadership as well
as the ruling party and the government made the traditional mistake of assuming the
workers as ‘passive agents’ of production as pointed out by Simon way back in 1951.
Let us remember that all the large units surveyed, either have, or are establishing, units
outside the state. They feel that it is not viable to establish a technologically-more-
advanced unit in the state because of the passive resistance from the permanent workers.
 It may be pertinent to note here that some business associations are highlighting a new
kind of trade union activity, which is in some sense a departure from the earlier prevalent
and orthodox ‘gherao culture’: At present labour believes in exerting a new kind of
indirect or surreptitious pressure; the contemporary motto appears to be ‘go slow on
work’. The management often do not even have the discretion to reject an application
for leave. Nowadays the management seldom have to encounter a written charter of
demands, what it has to face is some kind of continuous indirect pressure, which is a
serious deterrent to new investment in the state.
However, a basic question remains: why did a highly centralized party like CPIM or its
mass organization CITU let the unit level workers behave this way for so long?  First,
the union leaders cannot put pressure on the firm level units as there is ample chance of
losing support and consequently the vote bank. Recent political experience suggests
that the CPIM is in no position to risk its number of votes.  Three decades of central
control over the rank and file has significantly diminished. The local trade unionists of
CITU or the local party leaders have started behaving as independent institutions.
They wield much power in the areas directly under them. So, the unit level representative
unions have enormous hold over the contract/casual labourers. The management of the
large units, irrespective of market-orientation, maintained that they could not recruit
contract workers directly. Moreover, according to some independent trade unionists
and ex-employees, the unions also play a role in determining the renewal of the contracts
for these workers. Further, working in close association with the local party, the trade
union leaders often help the retrenched workers to get a rickshaw or an auto rickshaw
licence or even a job as helper in the construction sector. A patron-client relationship
thus develops especially with proliferation of jobless workers. Incidentally, CITU has
the largest membership in the construction sector which is basically unorganized. In
another context, Bardhan et al (2009) showed how this patron-client relationship helps
CPIM to remain in power in rural Bengal till recently.
There is a  second  related  reason.  A retired personal manager of Firm K notes that the
large-scale retrenchment of the organized workers in   the state and the increasing31
number of lockouts have created a distrust about the CITU leadership among the
workers. This may partly explain why Trinamul Congress has started gaining strength
in both urban and rural areas since mid-1990s. In Durgapur and in some areas of
Howrah industrial region, the status of representative trade union is enjoyed by the
Trinamul Congress in quite a few firms. The picture in the sample firms goes a long way
to support this fact (A7). This was unthinkable during the 1980s or even early 1990s.
Consequently the intra-union rivalry has increased significantly. This emergence of a
formidable opposition union  weakens the control of both the unions and sheer
disagreement between   rival unions thwarts production .
Finally, it needs to be mentioned that though there is a clear change in the policy stance
of the state including labour issues which has also been endorsed by the respondents in
our sample, the top leadership of the CPIM does not display a consensus in all matters.
The contradictory statements regarding ‘bandh’or strikes   by the CM  and the state
party secretary is an illustration. The same is true about the open argument regarding
land acquisition issues discussed before. The differences of opinion within the CPIM,
between the CPIM party organization and the government, and among different
constituent parties within the LF regarding industrialization issues have surfaced quite
often in recent years. The party cadres cannot fail to note  this lack of consensus at the
higher levels and use it to their advantage.  Given this situation the management
maximizes its gains by increasing the  informalization practices leading to a burgeoning
of unorganized activities in the state.
5. Conclusion
The industrial policy of 1994-95 professes to make WB a worthy destination for industrial
investment by improving infrastructure and simplifying regulatory processes. Despite
this, and an apparently tamed workforce, not much improvement has taken place in
the performance of the organized manufacturing in recent years. Till very recently, the
typically small entrepreneurs in the unorganized sector were producing  more than half
of the state’s manufacturing output, endorsing the trend that  set in during the 1960s,
and which is at odds with the overall Indian experience.
In exploring the somewhat contradictory behaviour between  policy and  performance
we found that the physical infrastructure was still wanting  particularly in the domains
of  power, water and, ports. In a densely-populated, highly fertile agrarian state there is
no clear and consistent thinking about  a land bank to facilitate industry, which has
momentous implications for the future of industrialization in the state. While the
regulatory regime  has been simplified to a great extent on paper, in practice we found
its secret presence at lower levels of  the bureaucracy frustrating the emergence of a32
benign relationship between  state and  business. In fact regulation hazards turned out
to be a major reason behind small firms desiring to operate from the unorganized
sector. Further,  infrastructural inadequacies, particularly power shortage, could be a
major reason leading  large-scale units not to expand their capacity but  farm out to the
unorganized sector. The business associations at every level, are unable to sort out these
issues.
Our findings also lead us to strongly suspect the apparently docile character of  organized
labour and their unions. In the guise of cooperative behavior, a consequence of the
dictates of the top,  organized labour in the state is showing an extreme path dependency
arising out of  uncertainty in the prospect of future gains. Consequently management is
weary of technology-intensive investments that can lead to human asset specificity and
in turn costly haggling. We detect   an implicit understanding between entrepreneurs,
organized labour and their unions. It seems that the state has also played a passive role
in this regard. This particular outcome has serious implications for the perpetuating
informalization in the state. This is all the more due   to easy availability of  unorganized
cheap labour and an old practice of farming out production to the small units in the
state. Management informalize production in more than one way by employing contact
workers and farming out production.  Trade unions also recognize the fact that to retain
power in a situation of decline, informalization to an extent is beneficial . On the one
hand, they have succeeded in achieving higher wages, even in the absence of
corresponding  productivity gains, for a small group of insiders (permanent workers);
on the other, they have been able to develop a typical patron-client relationship with
the contract workers.
But the question  remains that, given the Stalinist character of the ruling party in the
state and its mass organ (trade union in this case), why a strong party whip could not
implement the policy changes as it did with regard to land reform and decentralization
during the early years of the LFG ?
We find that having been in  power for a long time the ruling party or its mass organs
are no longer monolithic. There thus exists a multi-layered power structure in the state
where each local unit of the party weilds enormous power over the local people through
‘management of illegalities’ on the one hand and  promotion of ‘clientelism’ on the
other. The party has encroached upon every sphere thwarting smooth transactions.
Even if the top leadership wants the cadres to change their behaviour, unless the cadres
see the prospect of immediate gains, it is unlikely for them to behave in a ‘non-sticky’
fashion. Furthermore, when the LFG implemented its   land-reform and decentralization
programmes , howsoever successfully, the power structure within the party had not  got33
fractured. The leadership at the top is at present not as united as it was during the
earlier policy implementation years. It is unlikely that the cadres would miss this point
and not use it to their advantage. It is also important to remember that of late the
almost voiceless opposition is becoming increasingly stronger, thereby making the
situation in the state even more complex.34
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Appendices
A 1. Sampling methodology
We have tried to get information through semi-structured interviews with different
stakeholders such as bureaucrats, business houses/firms and business associations.
We have also tried to interact with representatives of different trade unions and in
some cases even with the workers. In order to choose the respondents we have
followed a purposive sampling method. The usual practice, however, is to go for
random sampling. Random sampling with limited resources (people, time, money
etc.) is particularly difficult and has a significant tradeoff with the quality of
information. Moreover, random sampling is called for when one is interested in
making estimates or inferences valid for a population from which the sample is
drawn. Instead we suggest a shift in favour of  a purposive sampling in order to
decide the number of respondents under each category (see Rudra,1989 for a very
comprehensive view on this).
Keeping the idea of purposive sampling in mind we decided to talk to the bureaucrats
in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry of the government of West Bengal and
some of the Members of the State Planning Board. We did also talk to a few retired
bureaucrats of the same department ( or related departments) to get the contrasting
views before and after the new economic policy of the state.  We have covered all the
leading business associations in the state representing large scale as well as the medium
and the small scale industries. However, we could not always decide the person we
would have liked to talk to. It was all decided by the availability of the respondents.
For choosing the business houses or firms we could go by a relatively more structured
manner. We concentrated on the organized manufacturing only. The problem we had
in hand was to (a) classify the sectors and then to (b) classify the firms.
(a) Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) classifies the sectors under manufacturing at
the two digit, three digit and in some cases even at the four digit level. We took
up the relatively broader classification following the two digit level. The sectors
were classified  first  on the basis of labour intensity per unit of output and
then on the basis of total factor productivity. This was done in order to get
sufficient contrasts. For the sake of convenience we considered only the latest
year. The degree of labour intensity had been classified into high (H) and low
(L) taking the state manufacturing sector average labour intensity as the dividing38
bar. Similar procedure had been followed for deciding the levels of productivity
of different sectors (high, low) as well.. This two way classification gave us a
fourfold classification of all the sectors such as HH, HL, LH and LL. From
these four fold classifications we chose only those sectors which constituted at
least five per cent of the total manufacturing net value added of the state. Thus
the sectors chosen were Basic metals, Machine tools, textiles including jute
and chemicals and non metallic minerals.
(a)  Secondly, we could collect a somewhat workable list of firms in different sectors
from the WBIDC. We tried to select firms of different sizes and with different
market orientations as both of these factors were likely to influence the state
specific SBRs. However, most of the time it was based on the availability of
firms who were ready to share information. Altogether 13 firms were selected
from the above mentioned sectors: 4 large, 4 medium and 5 small. The following
table summarizes the basic data about the selected firms in our sample. However,
finally the sector specific effect was difficult to determine. But the size and
market orientation did suggest some important clues.
The sampling procedure and the selected firms
Total Factor Productivity
Higher Than the State Average (H) Lower than the State Average (L)
Labour/ Capital (a)Textiles: Percentage share in The percentage shares of the
ratio the NVA:19.86 sectors in this category in the
net value added of the total
Higher than the Number of firms selected: 4 manufacturing were negligible.
state average (H) Size: three small, one medium
(b) Machine tools:Percentage
share in the NVA:4
Number of firms: 3, Size: two
small, one medium.
Labour/ capital Non Metallic minerals: (a) Basic Metal
ratio Cement: Percentage share in Percentage share in the NVA: 15.66
Lower than the the NVA:4Number of firms: Number of firms: one Size: large
state average (L) 2 Size: Large (b) Chemicals
Percentage share in the NVA: 18.09
Number of firms: 3
Size: one large, two medium.39
A2: Trend rate of growth of Manufacturing in WB During 1980/81 to 2004/05
Year Manufacturing Registered Unregistered
Manufacturing Manufacturing
1980-81 to 2004-05 5.78* 5.00* 6.68*
(0.27) (0.30) (0.26)
1980-81 to 1994-95 4.35* 3.57* 5.31*
(0.59) (0.71) (0.51)
1995-96 to 2004-05 4.62* 4.24* 5.01*
(0.25) (0.40) (0.37)
Source: National Accounts Statistics, West Bengal
A3: Percentage share of ex-factory value of industrial output in West Bengal in the
context of the country as a whole







Source: CSO, Govt. of India
A 4: Percentage share of the unorganized sector in the total manufacturing
employment of the state




Source: Population Census and ASI40
A 6: Trend rates of growth (per cent per annum) of some selected variables in West
Bengal manufacturing before and after the New Industrial Policy of the state in
1994-95
Variables 1980-81 to 1994-95 1995-96 to 2002-03
Employment - 2.02*(-6.30) - 7.19* (6.91)
Labour productivity 5.56* (7.37) 1.70 (0.87)
Wage rate 3.86* (12.66) 4.13* (10.17)
Wages to nva - 1.7* (-2.76) 2.47 (1.15)
Source: ASI,    Note: * indicates statistical significance at 5 per cent level. t-values are
given in the parentheses.
A7: Incidence of Trade Unionism in the Sample Firms
Firm type No Union One dominant More than one
union dominant union




Large domestic Firm I: CITU Firm H: CITU,
market oriented Trinamul Congress
Medium export Firm A, Firm E
market oriented
Medium domestic Firm L: CITU Firm M: CITU,
market oriented Trinamool Congress
Small export Firm B, Firm C,
market oriented Firm D
Small domestic Firm G Firm F:
market oriented Trinamul Congress
 Source: Same as Table 4.
A.5: Trend rate of growth of factory sector employment in WB
          (per cent per annum)
Years Employment
1980-81 to 2004-05 -2.10*(-7.24)
1980-81 to 1994-95 -2.02* (-6.30)
1995-96 to 2002-03 -7.19* (-6.91)
Source: ASI,     Note: t-values are given in the parentheses.